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ABSTRACT
NARRATIVES BY 6-YEAR-OLD AND 9-YEAR-OLD BOYS:
BRUTE, INSTITUTIONAL, AND NON-INSTITUTIONAL MENTAL FACTS
by Adam Craig Whipple
December 2013
Brute facts, institutional facts, and non-institutional mental facts were studied.
The philosophy of constructionism and the theory of intent provided a framework for this
research. Intentionality provided the basis for social facts. Brute, institutional, and noninstitutional mental facts were operationally defined. This study analyzed the use of
these facts in the narratives of 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys. There were a total of
19 participants in this research.
This research established brute, institutional, and non-institutional mental facts as
appropriate operational categories for studying children's narratives. The 6-year-old
boys produced more brute facts than the 9-year-old boys. The 9-year-old boys produced
significantly more institutional facts in spontaneous narratives than the 6-year-old boys.
The production of non-institutional mental facts was not significantly different between
the two groups.
The discussion pertained to the ramifications of these results as related to
spontaneous language samples, appropriate language sampling size, and the syntagmaticparadigmatic shift.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
Several scholars have discussed institutional facts and the distinction between
brute and institutional facts (Anscombe, 1958; Lakoff, 1987; Searle, 2011). Searle
(2011) stated, "We live in a sea of human institutional facts" (p. 90). Hund ( 1982) stated,
"Most philosophers have been perfectly ready to accept the notion of 'brute' facts , but
they have preferred to ignore the notion of ' social,' 'societal,' or 'institutional' facts" (p.
271 ). Searle ( 1997) stated that " ... since institutional reality is in some sense our creation
we ought to be able to state precisely the mechanisms of that creation and the ontology of
the resulting structure" (p. 458). Insofar as our society is impacted by institutional facts,
their existence and their use in social commerce warrant research.
Searle ( 1969) stated that the traditional models of language are "incapable of
dealing with institutional facts" (p. 184). Perhaps what Searle suggested is that the
traditional models do not consider consciousness and intent. Inasmuch as consciousness
and intent are significant features of brute and institutional facts, it is understandable why
Searle made this comment.
Lakoff ( 1987) stated, " ... unresolved is the question of whether a clear division
exists between brute facts and institutional facts" (p. 170). While scholars have discussed
brute and institutional facts and have provided preliminary definitions, no previous
operational definitions have been outlined. Likewise, no previous research has been
carried out to determine the difference in the use of brute and institutional facts in actual
social commerce. An analysis of the use of brute and institutional facts in spontaneous
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language samples has yet to be carried out. Such research could contribute to an
understanding of language abilities.
Significance of the Study
The authors of this study operationally defined brute facts and institutional facts
for the first time, thus providing a framework for working definitions for this and future
studies. This study investigated the existence of non-institutional mental facts and
likewise operationally defined them. This study compared the difference in the use of
brute facts, institutional facts, and non-institutional mental facts in the narratives of 6year-old boys and 9-year-old boys.
A spontaneous language sample often leads to a useful grammatical analysis of a
child's repertoire. This study considered the use of brute, institutional, and noninstitutional mental facts in children's narratives as a possible companion to grammatical
assessment. Presumably, this study will lead to further research concerning these facts
and their use in spontaneous narratives of children.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Constructionism
Constructionism is a philosophical view of language. Bruner ( 1986) stated that
constructionism recognizes the "mind as an instrument of construction" (p. 97). The
basic tenant of constructionism is that a child is an active processor of the world in which
he lives. Berger and Ludemann (1989) stated," ... reality is socially constructed" (p. 1).
Berger and Luckmann ( 1989) further stated, "Everyday life presents itself as a reality
interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world" (p. 19).
Searle ( 1995) stated, " ... we do not experience things as material objects, much less as
collections of molecules. Rather, we experience a world of chairs and tables, houses and
cars, lecture halls, pictures, streets, gardens, houses, and so forth" (p. 14).
To use one of Searle's examples, a car is actually a collection of metal, rubber,
and other materials. When one views an attractive new car, it is unlikely that he would
say to himself the following: / want to own that collection of metal and rubber. Rather,
he would more likely say to himself the following: / want to own that car. At some
point, probably early in childhood, that individual would have learned to experience that
collection of metal and rubber as a car. This is possible as an individual constructs
mental representations of his environment.
Bruner (1986) stated that a child actively constructs possible worlds through the
"transformation of worlds and world versions already made" (p. 97). Sperber and Wilson
(1986) stated, "An individual 's total cognitive environment...consists of not only all the
facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of... "
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(p. 39). Bruner (1986) stated, "We do not begin with something absolute or prior to all
reasoning, but. .. begin instead with the kinds of construction that lead to the creation of
worlds" (p. 97). Sperber and Wilson (1986) stated, "We are all engaged in a lifetime's
enterprise of deriving information from this common environment and constructing the
best possible mental representation of it" (p. 38). In this way we move "from electrons to
elections and from protons to presidents" (Searle, 2011, p. 1).
To use the latter of Searle's examples, it is unlikely that a child would view
President Obama as only a collection of protons and other molecules. Rather, a young
child may likely view President Obama first only as a man, just as any other man. Later,
as a child begins to construct mental representations of countries and governments, he
may then understand that President Obama is indeed the President and leader of a nation.
Some philosophies of the mind and language indicate an opposition between
mental states and physical reality, between culture and biology. However, Searle ( 1992)
stated, "Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and
are themselves features of the brain" (p. 1). Additionally, Searle (1995) stated,
" ... mental states are higher-level features of our nervous system ... " and, " ... there is no
opposition between culture and biology; culture is the form that biology takes" (p. 227).
Searle (2011) stated, "Consciousness and intentionality are caused by and realized in
neurobiology" (p. 25). Rather than being isolated entities, the mind, culture, and mental
states are inseparably connected to biology, physical reality, and the brain. Furthermore,
Searle ( 1995) stated that "the connecting terms between biology and culture
are ... consciousness and intentionality" (p. 228). Therefore, consciousness in general,
and intent in particular, are irreducible issues of language.
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Intent
Humans deal with intentionality, and Searle (1995) defined intentionality as "the
capacity of an organism to represent objects and states of affairs in the world to itself'
(p. 7). Searle (2011) subsequently defined intentionality as " ... that capacity of the mind
by which it is directed at, or about, objects and states of affairs in the world" (p. 25).
Sperber and Wilson ( 1986) stated, "Intentions are mental representations capable of being
realised in the form of actions" (p. 31 ). Nelson ( 1996) defined intentionality as "a
person's intention to carry out an action" (p. 293). Whenever an individual deals with
belief, desire, want, need, etc., that individual deals with intentionality.
Intent is the driving force of language. According to Bruner (1986), intent is the
"what for" of language (p. 157). Intent gives purpose to phonemes, meaning to
morphemes, and significance to syntax. Nelson (1996) stated, "It is the intentionality of
the actors that provides the consciousness, and ultimately the meaning, to the story"
(p. 188). Searle ( 1992) stated, "Consciousness is indeed consciousness of something, and
the 'of in 'consciousness of is the 'of' of intentionality" (p. 130). When an individual is
conscious of a belief, desire, want, need, etc., he is conscious of his intentionality, and it
is the intentionality which gives significance to language.
Language provides a social platform for expressing human intents. The primary
focus of language is the manifestation of intent, and all structured forms of language
serve intent. According to Searle ( 1969), language is "rule-governed intentional
behavior" (p. 16). Bruner ( 1986) stated, "Discourse is governed by the communicative
intentions of speakers" (p. 81). Sperber and Wilson (1986) stated that language is
important because" ... communication exploits that ability of humans to attribute
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intentions to each other. .. " (p. 24). Additionally, Sperber and Wilson (1986) said,
"Utterances are used not only to convey thoughts but to reveal the speaker's attitude to,
or relation to, the thought expressed" (p. 10-11 ). Therefore, language exists so that
human intents might become transmittable and recognizable (Sperber & Wilson, 1986).
Searle (1992) stated, "Any attempt to reduce intentionality to something nonmental will
always fail because it leaves out intentionality" (p. 51 ). If intent is removed from
language, a meaningless system of codes and symbols remains.
One unique attribute of language is its arbitrariness. A word is different from its
referent. A referent can be an idea, a concept, or an object. For example, the word table
does not have the physical form of an actual table. The set of five graphemes that
constitute the word table refers to an object. The word is arbitrary in form. Nelson
( 1996) stated, "Language brings mental models under symbolic control" (p. 68). The five
graphemes that represent a table are the structure under which a table is brought under
symbolic control. Rather than structure, function is the crucial issue. Nelson (1996)
stated, "Its structure emerges from its function but is not its primary focus. This
development must then be understood within the experiential-social-communicative
system" (p. 114). The structure of language has as much meaning and purpose as its
accompanying functions, consciousness and intention, allow.
Social Facts
In addition to the intentionality of an individual, there is also collective
intentionality (Searle, 1995). Searle (2011) stated, "Collective intentionality is a type of
intentionality, and society is created by collective intentionality" (p. 25). Collective
intentionality refers to two or more individuals intending to do something together, such
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as violinists playing together in an orchestra (Searle, 1995). When a group has collective
intention, they have the" ... capacity of conscious agents to create social facts ... " and
social reality (Searle, 1995, p. 19). Similarly, Wagner (1998) stated, "A constructive
event is an event in the course of which a something is named, equipped with attributes
and values, and integrated into a socially meaningful world" (p. 307).
Collective intentionality allows for humans to have the capacity to assign status
functions, which means " ... to impose functions on objects and people where the objects
and the people cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure.
The performance of the function requires that there be a collectively recognized status
that the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status that the person or object
can perform the function in question" (Searle, 2011, p. 7). The existence of the planet
earth is true independent of human agreement and collective intentionality. In contrast,
the existence of the state of Mississippi depends upon a collective agreement that the
mass of land bordered by the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico is in fact a state
named Mississippi. The land itself has no governmental status by virtue of its physical
features alone. Its status as an independent state is only a fact as long as a collective
society considers it so.
Searle ( 1995) stated that " ... social reality is created by us for our purposes and
seems as readily intelligible to us as those purposes themselves" (p. 4). In most cases, it
is easier to perceive objects and states of affairs "in terms of their socially defined
functions ," rather than in terms of their molecules and physical reality (Searle, 1995,
p. 4). Moreover, Searle (1995) stated, " ... once there is no function , no answer to the
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question, what's it for? we are left with a harder intellectual task of identifying things in
terms of their intrinsic features without reference to our interests, purposes, and goals"
(p. 5). This concept is coherent with the theory of relevance, which is the idea that
" ... there is a single property - relevance - which makes information worth processing for
a human being" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 46). Sperber and Wilson ( 1986) stated,
" ... humans automatically turn their attention to what seems most relevant to them"
(p. 50). Berger and Luckmann (1989) stated that " ... knowledge of everyday life is
structured in terms of relevances" (p. 45).
Searle (1995) identified social facts as a subcategory of mental facts. First, what
is a fact? Frege ( 1956) stated, "A fact is a thought that is true" (p. 307). Mental facts are
those facts which "are dependent on [humans] for their existence" (Searle, 1995, p. 9).
The following is an example of a mental fact: I want to go on vacation. For this sentence
to be true, a conscious human being must exist. The following sentence is an example of
a social fact: We want to go on vacation together. This sentence requires the existence of
two or more conscious individuals in order to be a fact. Likewise, the existence of the
state of Mississippi is a social fact, because a society of conscious humans must believe
in and agree upon the fact for it to exist.
Brute, Institutional, and Non-Institutional Mental Facts
Searle (1995) considered mental facts as being the opposite of brute facts. Lakoff
(1987) stated that brute facts are " ... those that are true regardless of any human
institution. Thus, someone's height is a brute fact, as is the atomic weight of gold"
(p. 170). Searle (1995) defined brute facts as" ... facts totally independent of any human
opinions .. .Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence" (p. 2).
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Anscombe (1958) defined brute facts as " ... the facts which held, and in virtue of which,
in a proper context, such-and-such a description is true or false, and which are more
' brute' than the alleged fact answering to that description" (p. 71 ).
The following is an example of a brute fact: The meadow is full of grass. This
sentence can be true independent of all human institutions and opinions. Whether or not
a human or group of humans believes, opines, or declares that the meadow is full of grass
has no actual bearing on the existence of this fact. Another example of a brute fact is the
following sentence: Earth has one moon. This statement is a fact, regardless of any
social or cultural agreement. A brute fact is a matter of the physical world and biology
(Searle, 1995).
Humans deal with more than brute facts. Anscombe (1958) first suggested the
idea that the world included not only brute facts, but also institutional facts upon which
society is built. Berger and Luckmann (1989) stated, "Society is a human product"
(p. 61). Zaibert (1999) said, "Some facts can exist independently of human beings and
their institutions; the existence of other facts depends on human institutions" (p. 274).
MacCormick (1998) stated, "Our judgment of the state of the world is not simply in terms
of pure physical fact and relationships, but in terms of an understanding of such facts and
relationships as humanly meaningful" (p. 323).
Institutional facts comprise a subcategory of social facts, which are in turn a
subcategory of mental facts (Searle, 1995). Institutional facts are, therefore, a type of
social mental facts. First, what is an institution? Searle (2011) stated, "An institution is a
system of constitutive rules" (p. 10). Anscombe ( 1958) stated, "The existence of the
description A in the language in which it occurs presupposes a context, which we will call
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'the institution behind A' ... For example, the institution of buying and selling is
presupposed to the description 'sending a bill'" (p. 72). Berger and Ludemann (1989)
stated that institutionalization is " ... the foundation for the social construction of reality"
(p. 182). Human institutions include systems such as "money, property, governments,
and marriages" (Searle, 1995, p. 1). Other examples of institutions include such things
as sports leagues, holidays, and elected positions. These entities are created by humans
and remain in existence based upon social norms or rules. Berger and Luckmann ( 1989)
stated, "Institutions ... by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by
setting up predefined patterns of conduct" (p. 55).
Lakoff ( 1987) defined institutional facts as facts " ... that are true by virtue of
some human institution. Someone's social standing and the dollar value of gold are
institutional facts" (p. 170). Searle (1995) posited that " . .. these are things that exist only
because we believe them to exist. .. facts dependent on human agreement. .. Institutional
facts are so called because they require human institutions for their existence" (pp. 1-2).
Hulsen ( 1998) stated that " ... an institutional fact is a meaning-content which achieves
intersubjective existence simply and solely by being generally accepted as such" (p. 284).
Therefore, in the case of Anscombe's example, receiving a bill is an institutional fact.
Speaking in brute terms, an individual may in fact be receiving a sheet of paper with ink
markings. The paper with ink becomes a bill once certain rules and norms are accepted
by a group of individuals, acting with collective intentionality.
Therefore, a mental fact may be a social fact if its existence involves two or more
individuals. Subsequently, a social fact may be an institutional fact if its existence is
dependent upon human institutions. A mental fact may exist independent of human
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institutions. Mental facts which exist independent of institutional facts are noninstitutional mental facts. The following sentence is an example of a mental fact that
exists independent of human institutions: We need the paper. The intention of needing
was performed by two or more individuals; however, this fact can exist independent of
collective human acceptance or recognition. Paper is paper "in virtue of intrinsic
physical structure" (Searle, 1995, p. 124). If the sentence is slightly altered- We need
the bill - then the new sentence becomes an institutional fact. The paper is now given a
social status. The existence of a bill requires certain "constitutive rules" upon which the
human institution of commerce is predicated (Searle, 1969, p. 186).
Searle ( 1997) stated, "Institutional facts require the existence of social
institutions" (p. 452). Searle ( 1997) stated, "The institutional fact that I bought a car with
money can only exist within such institutions as money, property and exchange"
(p. 452). The following example of a mental fact - / want to be with you - is dependent
upon the consciousness of one individual. If made plural - We want to be together - the
sentence becomes a social fact. If a human institution (marriage) is included - We want
to be married - the sentence becomes an institutional fact.
The following is another example of an institutional fact: The book costs 20
dollars. In order for this sentence to be a fact, the human institution of money must exist.
The paper, fiber, and ink that comprise a 20 dollar bill are recognized as a 20 dollar bill
based upon the human institutions of money and commerce. This sentence requires
human agreement regarding the worth of a dollar.

Another example of an institutional

fact is the following sentence: Barack Obama is the President. This sentence requires the
human institution of democratic government and human agreement regarding voting
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rights and voting procedures for its existence. An institutional fact is a matter of culture
and society (Searle, 1995).
Searle ( 1995) held that all institutional facts are reducible to brute facts and
require brute facts in order to exist. The previous institutional fact can be reduced to a
brute fact by doing away with societal norms, voting regulations, and constitutional
declarations. The following is an example of a possible remaining brute fact: Barack
Obama is a human. The fact that Barack Obama is a human exists independent of
societal acceptance. Hulsen (1998) stated, "An institutional fact is a fact simply and
solely because it receives acceptance as a fact" (p. 286).
The following institutional fact will now be examined: The team played a
basketball game. The game of basketball only exists " ... in the light of a common belief
that the situation is the case" (Hulsen, 1998, p. 284). Plausibly, five individuals could
work together to place a ball through a circle without playing a basketball game. The
existence of basketball and other sports " ... are facts, not because they are states of
affairs, but because they are generally accepted as states of affairs" (Hulsen, 1998,
p. 284). The following statement is a brute fact: Five individuals place a ball through a
circle. For this brute fact to be transformed into an institutional fact, a group must accept
a set of rules or norms. Hulsen (1998) stated, " ... the facticity of an institutional fact
depends on its being internalized by the members of a group. For it is only on this
condition that an institutional fact can have the same kind of incontestability as a brute
fact" (p. 285). Once the rules and norms of basketball are accepted by a group and
applied to the previously stated brute fact, the following institutional fact may be created:
The team played a game of basketball. As MacCormick ( 1998) stated, "That the one
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counts as the other depends on the possibility of interpreting what occurs in the light of a
norm or norms, that may range from the most informal implicit norm or convention to the
most highly formalized and articulated rule" (p. 333).
Important to this study is the consideration of fictional characters as institutional
facts. Hulsen (1998) posited that the existence of Santa Claus is an institutional fact,
insofar as Santa Claus is being discussed by children who believe in Santa Claus. Hulsen
( 1998) stated that because a group of adults know Santa Claus to be a fictitious character,
to them his existence ceases to be an institutional fact. As Searle (1995) stated,
institutional facts are " ... things that exist only because we believe them to exist. .. facts
dependent on human agreement" (p. 1-2).
Speaking in brute terms, fictional characters such as those seen on television
cartoons may actually be sketches, drawings, or animation. For example, the existence of
one large black circle with two smaller adjoining black circles is a brute fact. In contrast,
the existence of Mickey Mouse is an institutional fact. If a child utters the following
sentence - / want to watch Mickey Mouse - the child is producing an institutional fact.
The existence of Santa Claus and Mickey Mouse depend upon collective human
agreement. Although they remain fictitious, humans have agreed them into existence.
Without collective human agreement, the United States of America is no more real than
Santa Claus. Thus, for a child, the existence of fictional characters is an institutional fact.
One could inquire as to which institution fictional characters rely upon, since it
has been stated that a bill depends upon the institution of commerce and a state depends
upon the institution of government. For purposes of this study, fictional characters
depend upon the institution of fictional existence, insofar as humans agree them into
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existence. Since this study deals with 6-year-old and 9-year-old boys, fictional characters
such as Santa Claus are incorporated as part of an operational definition for institutional
facts. The question as to whether or not fictional characters are institutional facts for
adults is a topic for future research.
Zaibert ( 1999) applied the distinction between brute and institutional facts to
property rights over land, stating that, "the existence of parcels of real estate is wholly a
matter of human institutions: without humans all that exists is raw land. And what an
owner of landed property owns is not raw land. The owner owns a land-parcel, or real
estate ... " (p. 274). Indeed, institutions and institutional facts are required in order to own
land. Additionally, Zaibert ( 1999) applied the distinction between brute and institutional
facts to powers and rights, stating, "The existence of powers is, in most cases, a brute
fact, and the existence of rights is, in most cases, an institutional fact" (p. 274). More
research is needed in order to fully develop the latter idea.
Brute and Institutional Values
In addition to discussing brute and institutional facts, Genova ( 1970) also
discussed brute and institutional values. Using the example of chess, Genova (1970)
stated that a checkmate has more institutional value than a check. Speaking in brute
terms, both actions are the movement of an object from one location to another. It is the
social agreement upon the rules of chess that place higher institutional value on one
movement of an object in comparison to the movement of another.
The following institutional fact was found in the narratives analyzed in this study:
They won the SEC Championship. In accordance with Genova (1970), it can be assumed
that winning the SEC Championship has more institutional value than winning a
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scrimmage game. The distinction between brute and institutional values is a topic for
future research.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Research Question, Hypothesis, and Variables
Research Question
Is there a difference between the use of brute facts, institutional facts, and noninstitutional mental facts in narratives by 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys?
Null Hypothesis
There is no difference between the use of brute facts, institutional facts, and noninstitutional mental facts in narratives by 6-year-old and 9-year-old boys.
Directional Hypothesis
[Because no previous research was conducted to warrant a directional
hypothesis, it is appropriate to utilize a null hypothesis only.]
Variables
The independent variables are 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys. The
dependent variables are the use of brute facts , institutional facts, and non-institutional
mental facts in narratives.
Operational Procedures
This study utilized a total of 19 participants. Ten participants were 6-year-olds,
and 9 participants were 9-year-olds. The participants were from the greater Hattiesburg,
Mississippi, area. Parental permission was obtained and a consent form was signed
before procedures were administered. Approval was gained from the Institutional
Review Board.
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The participants produced language in the form of spontaneous narratives. The
language samples were collected by university students and professors in environments
familiar to the participants. Each utterance analyzed in this investigation was produced in
actual social commerce.
Those utterances which were incomplete or could not be categorized readily were
not included and were not counted in the average number of utterances per participant.
The following are examples of utterances found in the narratives which were not included
in this research:
l. Your turn.
2. The pizza.
3. The chief school.
4. Not that much pages.
5. Maybe two pages.
6. And three.
7. And ten fingers.
8. Like the fever on the next block.
9. That new commercial.
10. Not that big.
11. pne of my teachers.
12. One of my Spiderman movies.
13. An Eagle hat?
14. Mario vs. Donkey Kong.
15. You cheater.
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The narratives were then analyzed for the use of brute facts (B), institutional facts
(I), and non-institutional mental facts (N), according to the following operational
definitions:
1. Brute facts - those facts which deal with the physical world and exist
independent of human opinion and societal agreement, such as biology or
chemistry, personal physical experience, physical action or movement,
possession, and physical characteristics.
2. Institutional facts - those facts which require human agreement and social
institutions for their existence, such as holidays, sports leagues and teams,
fictional characters, school courses, games, money and commerce, elected and
appointed positions, cities/states/countries, marriage, etc.
3. Non-institutional mental facts - those facts which require cognition and
consciousness for their existence, yet exist independent of human institutions,
such as desire, knowledge, likes and dislikes, favorites, love and hatred, ease
and difficulty, need, motive, thought, forgetting and remembering, fear, etc.
The construct validity of this research method is based upon the theory of
constructionism. Specifically, the research focuses on the intent of the speaker by
utilizing spontaneous utterances, as opposed to elicited utterances. The participants were
not asked to perform tasks which they had never previously performed. Additionally,
these utterances came from actual social use of language, thereby giving the results
ecological validity.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 provides descriptive data for the study. Among 6-year-old boys, 1,946
utterances were recorded and analyzed. As displayed in Table 2, the 6-year-old boys
produced an average of 194.6 utterances. Brute facts (B) constituted a mean of 63.3% of
spontaneous utterances spoken. Institutional facts (I) constituted a mean of 11.2% of
spontaneous utterances spoken. Non-institutional mental facts (N) constituted 25.5% of
spontaneous utterances spoken.
Table 1
Descriptive Group Statistics for 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys

Count

Proportional

Group

Participants

Mean

Standard Deviati on

B- 6

10

123. l

14.1

B -9

9

103.9

29.9

1-6

10

2 1.5

13.8

1- 9

9

39.6

13.7

N-6

10

50.0

18.1

N- 9

9

43.7

15.l

Total - 6

10

194.6

16.3

Total - 9

9

187. 1

28.6

B- 6

10

.633

.057

B -9

9

.549

. 11 4

1- 6

JO

. 112

.074

1- 9

9

.2 14

.073

N-6

10

.255

.086

N- 9

9

.237

.088
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Among 9-year-old boys, 1684 utterances were recorded and analyzed. The 9year-old boys produced an average of 187.1 utterances. Brute facts (B) constituted a
mean of 54.9% of spontaneous utterances spoken. Institutional facts (I) constituted
21.4% of spontaneous utterances spoken. Non-institutional mental facts (N) constituted
23.7% of spontaneous utterances spoken.
Figure 1 provides visual comparisons of production of brute, institutional, and
non-institutional mental facts both within age group and between age groups. Both age
groups produced significantly more brute facts than institutional or non-institutional
mental facts. The 6-year-old boys produced significantly more non-institutional mental
facts than institutional facts. The 6-year-old boys produced more brute facts than the 9year-old boys. The 9-year-old boys produced significantly more institutional facts than
the 6-year-old boys. The use of non-institutional mental facts was comparable between
age groups.

Mean Proportion of Speech Production
by Category for Age Groups
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11.2
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54.9
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23.7

Figure 1. Mean Proportion of Production of Brute (B), Institutional (I), and NonInstitutional Mental Facts (N) in Narratives of 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys.
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Appropriate Categories
Table 2 displays the paired comparisons of production of brute, institutional, and
non-institutional mental facts within age groups. The 6-year-old boys produced
significantly more brute facts than institutional facts or non-institutional mental facts, and
they produced significantly more non-institutional mental facts than institutional facts.
The 9-year-old boys also produced significantly more brute facts than institutional
or non-institutional mental facts . The use of institutional and non-institutional mental
facts was not significantly different among 9-year-old boys. These results indicated that
the three operational categories utilized in this research are appropriate and useful for
studying narratives of 6-year-old and 9-year-old boys.
Table 2
Paired Comparisons for Brute (B), Institutional (I), and Non-Institutional Mental Facts
(N) for 6-Year-Old and 9-Year-Old Boys within Age Groups
Paired
Sig.

95 % Confidence
Upper

T

df

(2-tailed)

6-B -6-1

.594

16.3 73

9

.000

6-B - 6-N

.468

9.468

9

.000

6-1 - 6-N

-.037

-3.034

9

.014

9-B - 9-1

.465

5.917

8

.000

9-B - 9-N

.458

4.923

8

.001

9-1 - 9-N

.065

-.605

8

.562

As seen in Table 3, the use of institutional facts was significantly different in 6year-old and 9-year old boys. The 9-year-old boys produced significantly more
institutional facts in narratives than the 6-year-old boys. The use of non-institutional
mental facts was not significantly different across age groups. While the use of brute
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facts was not significantly different across age groups (the significance was .069), the 6year-old boys tended to produce more brute facts than the 9-year-olds.
Table 3
Independent Samples Test Comparing Production of Brute Facts (B), Institutional Facts
(I), and Non-Institutional Mental Facts (N) in 6-Year-Old Boys and 9-Year-Old Boys
across Age Groups
t-test for Equality of Means
95%
Sig.

Mean

Std. Error

(2-tailed)

Diffierence

Difference

Confidence
Lower

B-PROPORTIONAL
.069

.0844 167

.0421089

-.0077328

.007

-.1026022

.0336500

-.1736438

.654

.0182044

.0399492

-.066 1920

Equal variances not assumed

I-PROPORTIONAL
Equal variances not assumed

N-PROPORTIONAL
Equal variances not assumed

Discussion
Spontaneous Language Samples

In order for assessment to be valid, clinicians should obtain a language sample
that is representative of the individual's actual use of narratives. An individual's daily
use of language is the manifestation of the speaker's intentions and mental states. A
sample of the speaker's actual repertoire in social commerce provides a useful sample.
According to Ninio, Snow, Pan, and Rollins (1994), "A description of a language user' s
linguistic system must include information about the communicative intents s/he can
express" (p. 158). Cole, Mills, and Dale (1989) stated, "For young children in particular,
language sampling is believed to provide more representative information about the
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child's productive ability than more structured test procedures because it allows childinitiated language production" (p. 259).
Intent is the irreducible nucleus of language (Bruner, 1996). Bruner (1986)
stated, "Narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions" (p. 16). It follows that
the assessment of narrative should also deal with the human intentions. It is desirable for
clinicians to rely on language sampling when making judgments about a child's language
abilities. The critical question then becomes whether or not a specific language
assessment technique addresses the intent of the speaker. Clinicians who rely on elicited
or imitative behavior for language samples may miss the importance of the child's intents
and subsequently misrepresent the child's language ability. When predetermined
behaviors are elicited outside of social commerce, the resulting sample may be
misleading. Culatta, Page, and Ellis (1983) were concerned that some elicited approaches
may yield invalid results. Examples of such elicitation techniques are found in some of
the standardized, normative tests used in the field. Culatta et al. (1983) stated that it is
more efficacious to base language assessment upon "integrated.communicative
performance," rather than performance of isolated language rules (p. 66).
Syntagmatic-Paradigmatic Shift

White ( 1965) summarized the existence of a "miscellany of behavior changes
reported during the period from 5-7 years of age" (p. 208). Among those behavioral
changes, Woodrow and Lowell ( 1916) studied word associations in children and adults
and evidenced that a shift occurs in mental associations between childhood and
adulthood. This shift was later identified by Ervin ( 1961) as the syntagmaticparadigmatic shift. Ervin ( 1961 ), referring specifically to word associations, stated that
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there exists "a significant increase with age in the proportion of responses in the same
grammatical class as the stimulus-word" (p. 372). Brown and Berko (1960) found that in
a word association test, adult response words "usually belong to the same parts-of-speech
as the respective stimulus words ... the tendency to associate words within a part-ofspeech increases with age" (p. 13). Muma and Zwycewicz-Emory (1979) applied
"another paradigm to the shift of verbal behavior before and after seven" and found a
verbal shift between the uses of animate contexts in five year olds and nine year olds (p.
307).
Having done an analysis of many of Piaget's writings, White (1965) concluded
that for Piaget, the age of seven "is a transition point between major epochs of mental
development" (p. 210). When discussing the growth of thought in children, Piaget (1971)
found a distinction between children before and after seven years of age. Piaget (1971)
stated, "From 4 to about 7 or 8 years, there is developed ... an intuitive thought whose
progressive articulations lead to the threshold of the operation" (p. 123). Additionally,
Piaget ( 1971) stated, " ... From 4 to 7 years we see a gradual co:.ordination of
representative relations and thus a growing conceptualization, which leads the child from
the symbolic or preconceptual phase to the beginnings of the operation" (p. 129). Piaget
(1971) further stated, "From 7-8 to 11-12 years 'concrete operations' are organized, i.e.
operational groupings of thought. .. " (p. 123 ). Thus, children under seven years of age
deal more with intuition; children over seven years of age deal more with operations and
groupings.
The present study pertains to the literature on the syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift.
This study showed that nine year old boys produced significantly more institutional facts

25
in spontaneous narrative than did six year old boys. These results indicated yet another
cognitive-linguistic shift occurring at approximately seven years of age.
Language Sampling Size

Researchers and clinicians have long discussed the ideal size of a language
sample. Heilmann, Nockerts, and Miller (2010) stated, "Sample length undoubtedly
affects the reliability of language sample measures: Longer samples are usually more
reliable than shorter samples" (p. 402). Lee (1974) suggested acquiring a minimum of
"fifty complete sentences," and in some cases 100 utterances, in order to obtain useful
results (p. 66). Cole et al. (1989) studied the test-retest, split-half, and first-half versus
second-half results from language samples in ten children, ages 52-80 months. They
stated that, " . .. a second 100 utterance sample may provide 27% more lexical information
than the original 100 utterances sample" (p. 266). They further stated, " ... a 50 utterances
language sample may contain 73-83% of the lexical information found in a 100 utterance
sample. Whereas a larger sample will clearly provide additional information, gathering a
shorter sample may be more reasonable for clinical efficiency in some instances" (p.
266). Tyack and Gottsleben (1977) stated, "We have found that 100 sentences provide a
better (i.e., more typical) sample of a child's language than do samples of only 50
sentences. Moreover, small errors in the analysis procedure become less significant with
100 sentences than with the traditional 50" (p. 5).
Gavin and Giles (1996) evaluated the reliability of language sampling measures
and concluded, "Not until sample size reached 175 complete and intelligible utterances
did all of the measures reach the more stringent diagnostic criterion of a coefficient
greater than .90" (p. 1261). Muma et al. (1998) analyzed language samples of 400
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spontaneous utterances in seven preschool children. Muma et al. ( 1998) found, "The
overall sampling error rates for 50- and 100-utterance samples were very large, 55% and
40%, respectively" (p. 327). Muma et al. (1998) concluded, "With a sampling error rate
of about 15%, language samples should use 200 to 300 utterances to estimate most
grammatical repertoires" (p. 310).

In order to avoid an unacceptable sampling error rate, this study utilized an
average of 191.1 utterances per participant. It would be desirable for future research to
include 200 to 300 utterances per participant.
A voiding examiner influence

One could argue the point that the examiners could influence the use of
institutional facts in the narratives of children, by directing the spontaneous conversation
towards topics such holidays and sports. In this study, examiner influence was avoided
due to the fact that the examiners were na1ve to the research focus on brute and
institutional facts when the language samples were obtained.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
While further research is needed, this research indicated differences in the use of
brute, institutional, and non-institutional mental facts among 6-year-old boys and 9-yearold boys. The 9-year-old boys in this study produced significantly more institutional
facts in spontaneous narratives than the 6-year-old boys. These findings. indicate that 9year-old boys express more narratives dealing with human institutions (i.e. holidays,
sports leagues and teams, fictional characters, systems of measurement, school courses,
games, money and commerce, elected and appointed positions, cities/states/countries,
marriage, etc.) than 6-year-old boys.
Limitations of this research include both the number of 6-year-old boys and the
number of 9-year-old boys. Further research should include a larger number of both 6year-old male participants and 9-year-old male participants, to more fully appreciate the
role of brute, institutional, and non-institutional mental facts in their narratives. It is
desirable for further research to include the use of these facts in the narratives of girls and
the narratives of other age groups, such as 12-year-olds and 15-year-olds.
Another limitation in this research was the lack of previously outlined operational
definitions for brute facts, institutional facts , and non-mental institutional facts. Before
this study, the difference in brute and institutional facts was "an empirical question
awaiting a technique of investigation" (Brown, 1973, p. 146). The operational definitions
included in this research now provide an appropriate technique of investigation for brute
and institutional facts.
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An understanding of narratives by 6-year-old boys and 9-year-old boys may
provide an insight into language abilities other than grammatical skill alone. A
grammatical analysis may give different information than a brute and institutional fact
analysis. A brute and institutional analysis would add to, not replace a grammatical
analysis.
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APPENDIXB
RAW DATA FOR 6-YEAR-OLD BOYS
A total of 3,630 utterances were recorded and analyzed. An average of 191.1
utterances was obtained from each participant. The narratives of 6-year-old boys had an
average of 194.6 utterances per participant. The greatest number of utterances obtained
from one of the 6-year-old boys was 222 (J.S). The fewest number of utterances obtained
from one of the 6-year-old boys was 168 (T.J.). The highest frequency of brute facts
among the 6-year-old boys was 72.6% (L.J.), and the lowest frequency was 53.5%
(C.K.). The highest frequency of institutional facts among the 6-year-old boys was

21.7% (C.K.), and the lowest frequency was 1.8% (T.J.). The highest frequency of noninstitutional mental facts among the 6-year-old boys was 38.3% (S.S.), and the lowest
frequency was 12.8% (B.H.).
6-year-olds

Utterances

B

I

N

J.S.

222

143

18

61

T.J.

168

102

3

63

S.S.

214

122

10

82

I.T.

188

124

33

31

C.K.

198

106

43

49

J.H.

201

JJ 8

21

62

L.J.

201

146

6

49

J.R.

191

128

13

50

B.H.

187

127

36

24

G.S.

176

115

32

29

Total

1946

123 1

21 5

500
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APPENDIX C
RAW DATA FOR 9-YEAR-OLD BOYS
The narratives of 9-year-old boys had an average of 187.1 utterances per
participant. The greatest number of utterances obtained from one of the 9-year-old boys
was 212 (L.M.). The fewest number of utterances obtained from one of the 9-year-old
boys was 123 (A.L.). The highest frequency of brute facts among 9-year-old boys was
73.1 % (G.L.), and the lowest frequency was 41.5 % (A.L.). The highest frequency of
institutional facts among the 9-year-old boys was 33.0% (W.S.), and the lowest frequency
was 13.0% (L.S.). The highest frequency of non-institutional mental facts among 9-yearold boys was 37.4% (A.L.).
9-year-olds

Utterances

B

I

N

P.B.

205

95

43

67

L.S.

208

137

27

44

A.S.

190

83

46

61

A.L.

123

51

26

46

G.L.

182

133

31

18

L.M.

212

139

29

44

M.B.

162

84

52

26

w.s.

203

95

67

41

D.A.

199

11 8

35

46

Total

1684

935

356

393
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APPENDIXD
FACTS FOUND IN SPONTANEOUS NARRATIVES
The following are examples of brute facts (B) found in the narratives analyzed:
1. We read books in the morning.
2. You can dance.
3. I put my feet on it.
4. It rolls it down.
5. There's a line on the net.
6. There's a ramp on the side.
7. Every week we do different stuff.
8. I was doing a program.
9. I usually play by myself.
10. I have all of them.
11. I got the baby.
12. I just turned six.
13. Mine' s bigger.
14. The rat takes the cheese.
15. I'm just looking.
The following are examples of institutional facts (I) found in the narratives analyzed:
1. New York Giants are going to win the Super Bowl.
2. Boxing is a sport.
3. I was the stage manager.
4. We went to Texas once.
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5. My stepdad is [name].
6. I go to P.E. on Wednesday.
7. I have Lego Batman.
8. My sister's heifer is about to have a baby at the Dixie Nationals.
9. I got Honor Roll.
10. I have a quarter.
11. She's a princess.
12. They won the SEC Championship.
13. Have you seen Paul Bunyan?
14. Is he four inches?
15. We won first place one time.
The following are examples of non-institutional mental facts (N) found in the narratives:
1. He wants to attack my sister.
2. I like salads and taco salads.
3. It's hard to me.
4. I'll try and get this.
5. I think it's equal.
6. So, I don't want to get my feet dirty.
7. I know it's a cucumber.
8. I need his little float.
9. When we get on the trampoline [name] hates [name].
10. He's afraid of me.
11. We figure stuff out.

34
12. My favorite animal is the lizard.
13. I wanted to cry.
14. I don ' t remember the dog's name.
15. I like doing fun work.
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